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I. ADVANCING LIVING EXPENSES TO CLIENTS
Under Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(B) of the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility,1 an attor-
ney may pay costs incurred in trial preparation and litigation
only if the client remains unconditionally liable for repayment of
the advances. The attorney, however, may not advance funds to
clients for living expenses or any other needs not directly con-
nected with the costs of litigation.' In 1979, two South Carolina
attorneys were disciplined, in part for lending money to clients
for living expenses. Although the results in these cases are cor-
rect under the Code of Professional Responsibility,3 the facts in
each case raise questions about the desirability of the rule.
In re Pusser,' a disciplinary proceeding, concerned an attor-
ney who had been employed to represent a seventeen-year-old
boy in a personal injury suit. Before the suit was settled, the
attorney, Pusser, loaned the plaintiff's family $1000 for food and
Christmas expenses. The court found a violation of DR 5-
103(B), and ordered a public reprimand5 for this conduct and
for entering into a business transaction with an uneducated mi-
nor client without full disclosure.'
1. DR 5-103(B) reads:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litiga-
tion, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client,
except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, in-
cluding court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examina-
tion, and cost of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client re-
mains ultimately liable for such expenses.
2. Id.
3. South Carolina adopted the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY effective
January 1, 1970. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
4. 273 S.C. 115, 254 S.E.2d 926 (1979).
5. The court's opinion concentrated on the land sale to the client. The discussion of
the violation of DR 5-103(B) was confined to one paragraph. Id. at 116, 254 S.E.2d at
926.
6. Pusser sold five lots to the minor client with a profit of $800 on each. Pusser
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In In re Leppard, another attorney received a public repri-
mand8 in an order9 by a divided South Carolina Supreme Court.
Respondent was not charged with advancing funds to a client
until the grievance hearing on his alleged neglect of client mat-
ters was underway."0 At the hearing it was revealed that respon-
dent advanced approximately $1200 to a needy client to assist
with her living expenses."" The panel found that this conduct
violated DR 5-103(B)' 2 and, on appeal, the supreme court held
that the neglect of client matters and advancement of funds to-
gether warranted the public reprimand. 3 Justice Gregory dis-
sented, stating that a private reprimand, as recommended by a
unanimous panel and executive committee, was the appropriate
sanction. 4 Justice Gregory noted that the client in question had
an "acute financial need" and that the loan enabled her to pay
essential home maintenance expenses. 15 The dissent noted fur-
ther that, although the panel and executive committee found
that the advancement of funds violated DR 5-103(B), respon-
dent's conduct was not "offensive to the spirit and reason for the
insisted at the hearing that he disclosed his interest to the client but the client and his
father claimed that they were unaware of Pusser's ownership of the lots. The client be-
came dissatisfied with the transaction, offered to sell back one or two lots, but Pusser
would not buy. Id. at 117, 254 S.E.2d at 926-27.
7. 272 S.C. 414, 252 S.E.2d 143 (1979).
8. The public reprimand was for an "accumulation of violations" which included
two instances of neglecting to proceed with litigation on behalf of clients and one in-
stance of advancing financial assistance to a client. Both the panel and the executive
committee of the South Carolina Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
recommended a private reprimand as the appropriate sanction. Id. at 415, 252 S.E.2d at
144-45.
9. The public reprimand was ordered in a 3-2 decision. Justice Rhodes concurred in
Justice Gregory's dissent. 272 S.C. at 419, 252 S.E.2d at 145 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
10. 272 S.C. at 418, 252 S.E.2d at 145.
11. Id. Over the objection of respondent's counsel, evidence of the loans was admit-
ted and the panel subsequently allowed an amendment to the complaint to include an
allegation of respondent's improper advancement of funds to a client. Rule 24 of the
South Carolina Rules of Disciplinary Procedure permits amendments to complaints if
any party affected by the amendment is given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the
new allegation. The court found that respondent's opportunity to respond was "ample."
Id. (referring to RULE ON DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE FOR ATrORNEYS, S.C. SUP. CT. R. 24
(Cum. Supp. 1979)).
12. 272 S.C. at 418, 252 S.E.2d at 145.
13. Id. at 419, 252 S.E.2d at 145.
14. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 420, 252 S.E.2d at 146 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Respondent's secretary
also had made personal loans to the client. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
2




The propriety of advancing nonlitigation expenses to clients
was unclear prior to adoption of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in 1969. The Canons of Professional Ethics, the
predecessor to the Code, did not specifically address these loans.
Canon 42 read: "A lawyer may not properly agree with a client
that the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he
may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience,
but subject to reimbursement.' 1 7 Because this rule did not ex-
pressly mention advancing nonlitigation expenses, many courts
considered the practice permissible.'
ABA Formal Opinion 288, issued in 1954, evaluated the pro-
priety of advancing living expenses to personal injury clients
during the pendency of their claims.19 In this opinion, the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics concluded that "the activity...
would constitute a clear violation of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. '20 The opinion cited four canons in finding an ethical
violation in the making of loans, even those made to cover the
mere subsistence of plaintiffs so badly injured that they were
unable to work.2' The opinion declared that Canon 4222 allowed
advancements only for those expenses directly connected with
the litigation itself.23 Second, according to the committee, be-
cause the advanced funds clearly would be reimbursed out of
plaintiff's verdict, the attorney would acquire an interest in the
16. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
17. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 42.
18. Some courts have held that loans for living expenses are proper if not offered to
induce employment of the lawyer. See, e.g., Fail v. Gulf States Steel Co., 205 Ala. 148, 87
So. 612 (1920); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d 816, 117 P.2d 860 (1941); People v.
McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930); In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S.W. 922
(1924). Cf. State v. Rein, 141 Neb. 758, 4 N.W.2d 829 (1942)(holding loans to clients
improper only if clients' obligation to repay is contingent on the successful outcome of
the litigation); Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1952)(holding loans that
prevent clients from having to accept unduly low settlement offers are not against public
policy).
19. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954).
20. Id. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances is authorized by the
American Bar Association to issue opinions concerning proper professional conduct. 57
ABA REPORTS 50 (1922).
21. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954).
22. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 42, quoted in text accompanying note
17 supra.
23. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954).
1980]
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subject matter being litigated in violation of Canon 10.24 Third,
Canon 625 forbade a lawyer from representing conflicting inter-
ests and the committee reasoned that the attorney's interest in
repayment "might lead him to consider his own stake in the out-
come rather than that of his client."26 Finally, if the lawyer's
loans to clients became known publicly, clients might be im-
properly induced to employ him in violation of Canon 27.7
Case law since Opinion 288 has been conflicting. Some
courts declined to adhere to the committee's position while
others embraced the opinion's interpretation. Two cases con-
cerning the same attorney and the same course of conduct illus-
trate this dichotomy.29 John Ruffalo represented two clients
whose husbands were killed in railroad accidents.30 Loans for liv-
ing expenses, to be repaid regardless of the outcome of litigation,
were made at the request of the clients.31 The Ohio Supreme
Court disbarred Ruffalo, in part for making these loans, 2 yet the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ap-
proved his conduct and found that Ruffalo was fit to continue to
practice before it.
33
The state court found that Ruffalo's conduct violated Canon
10's proscription on "purchas[ing] an interest in the subject
matter of litigation," reasoning that the disabled indigent cli-
ent's agreement to repay the loan could be realized only from
24. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONA . ETHICS No. 10 read: "The lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting."
25. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6 read: "It is unprofessional to re-
present conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."
26. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL. ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954).
27. Id. "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, adver-
tisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted
by personal relations." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27.
28. Compare State v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1959); In re Ruffalo, 249 F.
Supp. 432 (N.D. Ohio 1965); In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865 (1965) with El
Janney v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Mahoning County
Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
29. Compare Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d
396, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964) with In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
30. 249 F. Supp. 432, 440 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
31. Id. at 443.
32. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
33. In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
4
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the proceeds received from trial or settlement of the client's
claim. 4 In effect, according to the court, "the attorney ha[d]
purchased an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. '3 5
The federal court rejected this reasoning: "It is not in conso-
nance with this court's concept of justice or the underlying pur-
poses of the Canons of Professional Ethics that a loan otherwise
proper is rendered improper because of the indigency of the cli-
ent."3' The court concluded that unconditional loans to clients
are not improper even though the clients may not be able to
repay without favorable recovery on the client's claim.37
Thus, despite Opinion 288's clear prohibition of loans for
living expenses, some courts refused to find a violation of profes-
sional ethics in the making of these loans. In 1969, however, the
Code of Professional Responsibility incorporated the view ex-
pressed in Opinion 288. Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) states un-
equivocally that financial assistance to clients during pendency
of litigation is not permitted, except for advances to cover litiga-
tion expenses.38 This strict approach39 has been adopted by the
South Carolina Supreme Court.
40
34. 176 Ohio St. at 264-65, 199 N.E.2d at 398 (citing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS No. 10).
35. 176 Ohio St. at 264-65, 199 N.E.2d at 398.
36. 249 F. Supp. at 443.
37. Id. at 445.
38. DR 5-103(B), full text quoted at note 1 supra.
39. The Preliminary Statement of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
"The Disciplinary Rules . . . are mandatory in character .... [They] state the mini-
mum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to discipli-
nary action." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT.
40. See note 3 supra. In contrast to the strict approach of DR 5-103(B), some states
have altered or eliminated that provision. Rule 5-104 of the professional conduct rules
for the California Bar, for example, states in pertinent part:
(A) A member of the State Bar shall not directly or indirectly pay or
agree to pay, guarantee, or represent or sanction the representation that he will
pay personal or business expenses incurred by or for a client, prospective or
existing and shall not prior to his employment enter into any discussion or
other communication with a prospective client regarding any such payments or
agreements to pay; provided this rule shall not prohibit a member:
(1) with the consent of the client, from paying or agreeing to pay to
third persons such expenses from funds collected or to be collected for
the client; or
(2) after he has been employed, from lending money to his client upon
the client's promise in writing to repay such loan; or
(3) from advancing the costs of prosecuting or defending a claim or
1980]
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Disciplinary Rule 5-103, however, presents some inconsis-
tencies with other provisions of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Opinion 288, the apparent inspiration4 ' for DR 5-
103, suggested several reasons for prohibiting these loans. One
rationale is the same as that given by the court in Ruffalo: a loan
for nonlitigation expenses is an inappropriate acquisition of an
interest in the litigation.42 This reasoning, however, falters in
light of the exception to DR 5-103(A) that allows the attorney to
make a contingent fee contract with a client.43 Although Ethical
Consideration (EC) 2-20 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility justifies the contingency fee arrangement by explaining
that some claims might not otherwise be pursued,4' it does not
distinguish this arrangement frQm the loan. Although an attor-
ney retained on a contingent fee contract does not pay money
over to the client, that attorney nonetheless has a substantial
proprietary interest in the outcome of his client's case. As a
practical matter, even when the fee is computed on an hourly
basis, the attorney has an obvious economic interest in his cli-
ent's claim.45
Some commentators, emphasizing that a personal injury
action or otherwise protecting or promoting the client's interests. Such
costs within the meaning of this subparagraph (3) shall be limited to all
reasonable expenses of litigation or reasonable expenses in preparation
for litigation or in providing any legal services to the client.
(C) Nothing in this Rule 5-104 shall prohibit a member of the State Bar
from reading or showing this Rule to a prospective client and describing the
nature and extent of the conduct prohibited by this rule.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
The Texas version of DR 5-103 does not include subsection (B) of the ABA rule.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 304-320a-1 (tit. 14 app.) (Vernon 1973).
41. ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 is cited in a footnote to
DR 5-103(B) with the signal "cf."
42. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
43. DR 5-103(A)(2) states in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest. . . except that he may:
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil
case.
DR 5-103(A)(2) (footnote omitted). An attorney, however, may not enter into a contin-
gent fee arrangement in a criminal proceeding. DR 2-106(C).
44. EC 2-20.
45. One of the reasons for contingent fee arrangements is that a successful claim
produces a res out of which the attorney's fee can be paid. Of course, a client's ability to
pay may depend on the success of the claim and the production of a res. See EC 2-20.
6
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plaintiff may be unable to work, soundly criticize the prohibition
on advancement of funds. The rule, according to these critics,
may force a client suffering financial hardship to accept an un-
justly low settlement offer.46 One critic claims the rule is mere
self-paternalism, "serv[ing] as a crutch for soft-hearted lawyers,
who can respond to imploring clients, 'I would love to help you
out, but rules of professional ethics prohibit me from doing
so. ,,47 In one court's view, this prohibition works only to cause
hardship to indigent persons who may already be disadvantaged
by a loss suffered as a result of an injury or other cause for
suit.48 Justice Gregory, dissenting in In re Leppard, implied that
cases concerning violations "not . . .offensive to the spirit and
reason for the rule" may justify the imposition of relatively leni-
ent sanctions.49 This view underscores some of the concerns that
the strict rule generates. This case-by-case approach, however,
leaves a degree of uncertainty in the application of the rule.
The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly found that the
conduct of attorneys Pusser and Leppard violated DR 5-103(B).
The question remains, however, of what place DR 5-103(B) has
in the rules of professional ethics. If the decision to advance
money to clients for living expenses were made a discretionary
matter, it would become one of a business, rather than an ethi-
cal, nature. The granting of loans to clients in need may be un-
wise as a business practice, 50 but it should not be considered un-
ethical in light of similar permissible financial arrangements
between attorneys and clients. The flat prohibition contained in
DR 5-103(B) fails to recognize that some attorney-client rela-
tionships spring from long-established personal friendships; thus
the "ethical" lawyer is forced to choose between providing a cli-
ent with no financial assistance at all or making an outright
46. See, e.g., Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?,
57 N.C.L. REv. 497, 498 n.6 (1979).
47. Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of Professional Stan-
dards, 57 N.C.L. REv. 559, 591 (1979).
48. See In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
49. 272 S.C. at 420, 252 S.E.2d at 146 (1979)(Gregory, J., dissenting).
50. One rationale behind the Code's prohibition of client loans for living expenses is
that the practice gives an unfair competitive advantage to lawyers willing to make these
loans because clients may come to the lawyer for this service, rather than for his skill as
an attorney. The practice would not necessarily lead to greater profits, however, since the
lawyer takes the risk that the loan may never be repaid.
1980] 171
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gift.5 1
The proposed replacement of the current Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the Rules of Professional Conduct, retains
the prohibition of loans for living expenses.12 The Comment to
that proposed rule suggests that the rule is designed to prevent
"unfairness to the client."53 This prohibition, however, does lit-
tle to guarantee that fairness will prevail in attorney-client rela-
tions. If anything, it puts an attorney in a tenuous position. One
commentator summarizes the difficulties with the apparent ra-
tionale for DR 5-103(B) and states why the prohibition deserves
reconsideration:
In labeling as unethical a lawyer who acts as a good Sa-
maritan and punishing him for acts of generosity the Code
reaches a shocking result. Such a provision may enhance the
income of attorneys, but it has no place in a body of rules for
professional behavior. Since advancing litigation-related ex-
penses, which may involve thousands of dollars for depositions
and expert witnesses, is permitted, it is ludicrous to suggest
that advances for living expenses will compromise attorney in-
dependence. The disparate effect of the present rule on impe-
cunious clients is an additional reason for its abolition.5'
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In Shealy v. Walters,5 the South Carolina Supreme Court,
51. EC 5-5, which discourages gifts from client to attorney, does not mention gifts
from attorney to client. EC 5-5. See In re Bloom, 265 S.C. 86, 89, 217 S.E.2d 143, 145
(1975).
52. The new rule in pertinent part states:
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, repay-
ment of which is contigent on the outcome of the matter;
(2) A lawyer or legal services organization representing a client without
a fee may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of a client.
DIsCUSSION DRAFT OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1.9(e), 48 U.S.L.W.
(Supp. No. 32) (Feb. 19, 1980). This draft is a result of the work of the ABA Board of
Governors' special committee. The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
was established to reevaluate the Code of Professional Responsibility. See generally
Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 46, 47
(1980).
53. DIscussIoN DRAFT OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1.9 Com-
ment, 48 U.S.L.W. (Supp. No. 32) (Feb. 19, 1980).
54. Huber, supra note 47, at 591-92.
55. 273 S.C. 330, 256 S.E.2d 739 (1979).
[Vol. 32
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reversing a lower court decision, found a defendant attorney lia-
ble for legal malpractice. The attorney had failed to properly ex-
ecute a real estate deed that was subsequently cancelled by an
equity court.56 The supreme court refused to consider defen-
dant's contention that the order of the equity court was in error
and thus the real cause of plaintiff's injury, and found that de-
fendant was negligent as a matter of law and liable for the full
amount of plaintiff's damages. The court held that even though
there may have been other causes of plaintiff's injuries, a plain-
tiff can recover against an attorney for legal malpractice if the
attorney's conduct was "a contributing proximate cause. ' '57
On October 29, 1971, Trippett Boineau, as sole stockholder
of Rockie Realty, contracted to buy a large tract of land from
W.C. Ellis. The contract was made in the name of the corpora-
tion and recited a purchase price of $114,000. The sale was to be
financed by Boineau's unsecured personal and corporate note.58
Defendant attorney Walters prepared a deed from Ellis to Rock-
ie Realty. Boineau, who planned to mortgage the property for
$100,000 to finance the deal, was unable to obtain the loan. He
then asked plaintiff Shealy to buy the property and form a cor-
poration to procure the $100,000 loan. The seller was unaware of
this arrangement.59
On December 7, 1971, Ellis executed a deed to Rockie Re-
alty. Boineau signed the note, as Rockie Realty's president and
individually, in favor of Ellis. Walters or his secretary thereafter
allegedly erased "Rockie Realty, Inc." from the deed and substi-
tuted "S.H.J., Inc." although the latter entity did not yet exist.
The articles of incorporation of S.H.J., Inc. were signed on De-
cember 8 and validated by the Secretary of State on December
13. On December 14, Shealy executed S.H.J.'s mortgage on the
property in favor of American Bank and Trust with a note paya-
ble one year from that date. Walters represented both Boineau
and Shealy in all of the described transactions and disbursed the
mortgage proceeds to Boineau60
56. Id. at 334, 256 S.E.2d at 741.
57. Id. at 338, 256 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added).
58. The note on its face purported to be a "mortgage note" but was actually un-
secured. Id. at 333, 256 S.E.2d at 741.
59. Id. at 332, 256 S.E.2d at 740.
60. Id. at 333, 256 S.E.2d at 741. The major portion of the loan proceeds was paid
over to Boineau per Shealy's instructions. Shealy, however, was under the impression
1980]
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Rockie Realty was declared bankrupt in October 1972. In
December, S.H.J., Inc. made payment on the note to the bank.
In January 1973, the seller Ellis, not having been paid, obtained
an uncollectible judgment against Boineau on the note executed
by Rockie Realty and Boineau, individually. After deeding the
property to Shealy, individually, S.H.J., Inc. was dissolved. In
April 1976, Judge Francis B. Nicholson of the Abbeville County
Court of Common Pleas, sitting in equity, cancelled Shealy's
deed and revested title in Ellis on the ground that the deed was
unlawfully altered after execution without the seller's
knowledge. Thus, the seller reacquired title to the land;
Boineau's corporation, which received a large portion of the
$100,000 loan payment made by Shealy, was bankrupt; Shealy,
who had paid the loan, had nothing."1 Shealy brought suit
against Walters.
Shealy's complaint against Walters alleged several acts of
negligence: the deed was not properly prepared, the seller did
not initial the corrected deed, no assignment of the land sale
contract had been made, and the seller was not informed that
Boineau's note was merely an unsecured, promissory note.62
Walters' answer asserted a general denial, estoppel, plaintiff's
contributory negligence, and the invalidity of plaintiff's claim
because he received a fee simple title. 3
The court outlined the three elements of proof necessary to
recover in an action for malpractice: (1) that plaintiff was in-
jured, (2) that defendant was negligent, and (3) that defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause or a contributing proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury.6 4 The court found that Shealy carried
his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and held
that Walters was liable for legal malpractice.6 5
Although the elements of injury and negligence were clearly
established, 6 the court's analysis of the proximate cause issue is
that the money was to be passed to the seller. Id.
61. Id. at 334, 256 S.E.2d at 741-42.
62. Record at 2-8.
63. Id. at 18-22.
64. 273 S.C. at 335, 256 S.E.2d at 742.
65, Id. at 338, 256 S.E.2d at 743.
66. Shealy had nothing to show for the $100,000 he paid the bank. Walters, as attor-
ney for Shealy, negligently carried out his duty to Shealy to prepare the documents so
that Shealy would be assured of valid marketable title. The supreme court held Walter's
[Vol. 32
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troublesome. Causation in fact6 7 and proximate cause" are two
distinct issues in tort law. The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, failed to distinguish the two.6 9 The court noted that
"[b]ut for the Walters erasure, there would have been no suit by
Ellis and Shealy would have the land. '70 It failed, however, to
establish that this action was the proximate cause of Shealy's
injury. Thus, although the result in Shealy may be correct, the
decision will give lower courts little guidance for deciding cases
in which a party's loss is less obvious than Shealy's.
The distinction between cause in fact and proximate cause
is conceptually and adjudicatively useful. Although a party's
conduct may have, as a matter of fact, caused a particular result,
"whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for
the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred,"
as Prosser explained, is a separate matter.7 1 According to Pros-
ser, the proximate cause issue can be reduced to the question,
"was the defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against
the event which did in fact occur?" 72 Although the court cor-
rectly concluded that Walters' action was a cause of Shealy's in-
jury, it failed to determine if Walters had a duty to protect
Shealy from the resulting harm. This failure by the court forced
it to reach the diluted conclusion that although "there may have
been. . . other causes of the injuries[,] [i]t is. . . sufficient...
[that] defendant's conduct is a contributing proximate cause."
'7 3
There is no doubt that Walters had a duty to Shealy arising
actions to be negligent as a matter of law because the substitution of grantees in the
deed did not vest title in S.H.J., Inc. 273 S.C. at 336, 256 S.E.2d at 742.
67. Causation in fact "embraces all things which have so far contributed to the re-
sult that without them it would not have occurred." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971).
68. "[A]s a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is
justified in imposing liability." Id. at 236-37.
69. See 273 S.C. at 336-38, 256 S.E.2d at 743. See Torts, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 131, 135-36 (1979). The South Carolina Supreme Court is
not alone in confusing proximate cause with causation in fact. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis,
13 Cal. 3d 349, 360-61 n.9, 530 P.2d 589, 596-97 n.9, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 628-29 n.9
(1975); Toomer v. Breau, 146 So. 2d 723, 727 (La. App. 1962).
70. 273 S.C. at 338, 256 S.E.2d at 743.
71. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 42, at 244.
72. Id.
73. 273 S.C. at 338, 256 S.E.2d at 743.
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from the attorney-client relationship. 4 If the supreme court had
discussed this relationship in the context of proximate cause, its
decision would have greater precedential value.
7 5
Further, Shealy does not fit neatly into the usual categories
of malpractice litigation.7 6 In the typical malpractice action, -the
attorney defends by asserting that plaintiff's underlying claim
was not meritorious and that plaintiff would not have recovered
even if the attorney had not been negligent. This burden has
often been identified as the "suit within a suit" rule; the original
action or appeal must be litigated within the malpractice action
to prove that "but for" the lawyer's negligence, plaintiff would
have succeeded in the underlying action.7 7 Shealy, however, was
not a typical "suit within a suit." Instead of arguing that the
client's claim lacked merit, Walters argued that the plaintiff who
did not win in his previous action in equity court should have
won. The judge's error in that proceeding thus caused injury
that Shealy would not have suffered otherwise, even though
Walters, admittedly, was negligent. Contending that the order
divesting Shealy of title was incorrect, Walters argued that
Shealy's proper course was to seek an appeal of that order. 8
The supreme court, however, refused to inquire whether the
equity court erred:
The order of Judge Nicholson is not subject to attack in this
action. It is presumptively correct, but whether it is correct or
incorrect is of no real consequence in this action. That order
settled a dispute between Ellis and Shealy. The order declared
title in Ellis. Even if the order is incorrect, it does not mean
that Shealy has good title. This is an action in tort and is not
one for the purpose of trying title to land. This court makes no
74. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 72, at 99 (1977); Bridgmen,
Legal Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong Plaintiff's Case, 30
S.C.L. REv. 213, 221 (1979); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 755, 757 (1959); Comment, 27 ARK. L. REv. 452, 455 (1973).
75. The court did find that an attorney-client relationship existed between Shealy
and Walters. 273 S.C. at 334, 256 S.E.2d at 741.
76. Malpractice usually arises from negligence in litigating a case or arguing an ap-
peal, negligent execution of written instruments, giving erroneous legal advice upon
which the client relies, or careless failures to comply with legal technicalities (e.g., stat-
utes of limitations).
77. See Coggin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225
(1958). The traditional "but for" test is commonly used in these suits.
78. 273 S.C. at 337, 256 S.E.2d at 743.
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intimation relative to ownership of the property.79
If the settled rule of law is that alteration of the grantee's
name after execution of the deed does not revest title in the
grantor, as suggested by the lower court,80 then Shealy's loss of
the land to Ellis would have been the result of error by the eq-
uity court. The supreme court completely avoided this issue by
refusing to support either the lower court's or the equity court's
opinion. Thus, the court did not make a determination that was
crucial to proper proximate cause analysis. If the lower court's
view was correct and title did not revest in the grantor, the eq-
uity court's action was indeed the proximate cause of Shealy's
loss. Walters' actions, although negligent, would have had no ef-
fect on the loss. If, however, the equity court's view were
adopted, the supreme court's decision would be correct.
An alternate theory of liability could have lent itself to the
same result based on the same claim. To find the attorney liable
for malpractice, the court could have relied on the fundamental
breach by Walters of the attorney-client duty in his representa-
tion of two parties (Shealy and Boineau) with potentially con-
flicting interests. The attorney who represents clients with con-
flicting interests breaches his fiduciary duty and this breach can
render him liable for damages.81 "The rule that one may not re-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 336-37, 256 S.E.2d at 742-43. The supreme court said that a substitution
of the grantee did not divest the original grantee of title. Id. at 336, 256 S.E.2d at 742
(citing Booker v. Stivender, 47 S.C.L. (13 Rich.) 85 (1860)). There is authority for the
proposition that once a deed is delivered, erasure of the grantee's name and the substitu-
tion of a new grantee neither divests the original grantee of title nor transfers title to the
substituted grantee. See Carr v. Frye, 225 Mass. 531, 114 N.E. 745 (1917).
The effect of an alteration of a grantee's name on a deed seemingly is not well set-
tled in South Carolina, however, as evidenced by the varied conclusions drawn by the
three courts considering the transaction. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that
title remained in Rockie Realty, Inc. (Boineau): "[w]hen Ellis signed the deed in favor of
Rockie Realty, Inc., Rockie Realty, Inc. became vested with title, and the substitution
did not serve the purpose of divesting Rockie Realty, Inc. of the title Ellis had conveyed
to it." 273 S.C. at 336, 256 S.E.2d at 742. The lower court in Shealy found that title
vested in Shealy: "However haphazardly and carelessly defendant effectuated the trans-
fer, as a matter of law title did become vested in S.H.J., Inc. [Shealy]." 273 S.C. at 336-
37, 256 S.E.2d at 742. The equity court in the suit to cancel the deed found that title
revested in Ellis: "the deed.., is hereby declared to be cancelled, null, void and of no
force and effect, and title to the said property revested in the plaintiffs [Mr. and Mrs.
Ellis]." Record at 93.
81. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 74, § 99, at 147.
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present conflicting interests is simple, but the bar, through igno-
rance, inattention, or greed, shows an appalling ability to disre-
gard it."
' s2
A recent California case, Spindler v. Kirtland & Packard,83
illustrates well the malpractice action based on conflicts of inter-
est. The attorney in Spindler was retained by the common in-
surer of an orthopedist and a neurosurgeon, defendants in a
medical malpractice case. Plaintiff's case against the neurosur-
geon was weak; his case against the orthopedist was strong. The
apparent strategy to prevent the defendants' implicating one an-
other by having the same attorney represent them failed and
both were found liable for medical malpractice. The attorney ad-
vised the neurosurgeon to refrain from making statements that
were incriminating against his co-defendant but exculpatory to
himself. The neurosurgeon did so and subsequently sued the at-
torney for malpractice. The neurosurgeon was awarded a jury
verdict of $130,000 based on the conflict of interest.84
The undisputed testimony in the Shealy case was that Wal-
ters represented both Boineau and Shealy in the land transac-
tion at issue. The supreme court could have premised its finding
of malpractice on a conflict of interest theory and the resulting
breach of Walters' fiduciary obligation to Shealy. The causation
issue then would have concerned the attorney's malfeasance in
allowing the loan proceeds to be paid directly to Boineau in con-
travention of Shealy's interest in having the seller Ellis receive
prompt payment for the land. If Waiters had properly guarded
Shealy's interest by seeing that Ellis was paid, Shealy's title to
the land may never have been challenged. The conflict of inter-
est in the case appears clearer than the degree of culpability for
erasing the deed. One result of the Shealy decision may be a
liberalization of the burden of proof that a plaintiff must meet
in his legal malpractice claim. The Shealy case held that an at-
82. Bridgman, supra note 74, at 232.
83. No. SEC 13505 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., filed March 1978), cited in Bridgman,
supra note 74, at 232 n.56 and accompanying text. See also Brosie v. Stockton, 104 Ariz.
574, 468 P.2d 933 (1970); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406
(1968); Ishmael v. Willington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Public Taxi
Serv. Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 452, 357 N.E.2d 1232 (1976); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Comstock, 23 Md. App. 502, 327 A.2d 891 (1974); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn.
324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977).
84. Bridgman, supra note 74, at 233.
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torney is liable for malpractice if guilty of negligent conduct that
was a "contributing proximate cause" of his client's injury. That
standard in itself suggests a client need only show that the attor-
ney's negligence was one of the causes in fact of the client's loss
in order to recover in a malpractice action. As a result, the set-
tlement value of malpractice claims may increase, as may the
proclivity of clients to bring malpractice actions.
III. LAWYER COMPETENCY
Regulation of the legal profession is primarily the responsi-
bility of the states.8 5 In every state the courts have jurisdiction
over admission to practice law and, as an incident thereto, the
inherent right to supervise the bar.86 In South Carolina, the
state supreme court's power to supervise the bar is granted by
the state constitution 87 and is recognized by statute.8 8 Pursuant
to its inherent supervisory power, the South Carolina Supreme
Court promulgated new requirements affecting both prospective
and current members of the bar. The new requirements are in-
tended to assure and enhance the competency of lawyers prac-
ticing in the state.
The competence of lawyers in general has been under vigor-
ous attack in recent years and influential public figures have not
been silent amidst the general demand for a more competent
bar.89 Chief Justice Warren Burger, for example, has asserted
that "from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in
the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate
representation."90 The need for a mechanism assuring lawyer
85. See generally U.M.W. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
86. Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, ABA SPECiAL
COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, 10, 13 (1970).
87. "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice
of law and the discipline of persons admitted." S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
88. "The inherent power of the Supreme Court with respect to regulating the prac-
tice of law, determining the qualifications for admission to the bar and disciplining, sus-
pending and disbarring attorneys at law is hereby recognized and declared." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 40-5-10 (1976).
89. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 49 PA. B.A.Q. 212,
215-20, (1978); President Carter's Attack on Lawyers, President Spann's Response, and
Chief Justice Burger's Remarks, 64 A.B.A.J. 840 (1978).
90. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
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competency is well recognized by those who have studied the
problem, although different approaches have been suggested. 1
The standard of competency most frequently noted is that man-
dated by the Code of Professional Responsibility: "[a lawyer]
should strive to become and remain proficient in his practice
and should accept employment only in matters which he is or
intends to become competent to handle. 91 2 Apparently it is this
measure that the new requirements promulgated by the South
Carolina Supreme Court are intended to achieve.
A. Prospective Members of the Bar-Rule 5
Rule 5 of the Rules for the Examination and Admission of
Persons to Practice Law in South Carolina was amended three
times in 1979.11 In its final form, 4 the rule requires persons
seeking to practice law in South Carolina to have successfully
completed law school courses in fourteen designated subject-
matter areas,95 eleven "trial experiences" of either a par-
ticipatory or observatory nature,96 and the new Multistate Bar
91. See, e.g., Leete & Loeb, Continuing Legal Education-Should It Be Compul-
sory?, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110 (1975); Parker, Periodic Recertification of Lawyers: A Com-
parative Study of Programs for Maintaining Professional Competence, 1974 UTAH L.
REV. 463; Petrey, Professional Competence and Legal Specialization, 50 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 561 (1976); Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574
(1975).
92. EC 6-1.
93. The court amended Rule 5 on February 6, April 25, and December 14, 1979.
94. RULES FOR THE EXAMINATION AND ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO PRACTICE LAW IN
SOUTH CAROLINA, S.C. Sup. CT. R. [hereinafter cited as ADMISSION RULES] 5A, 5B (Cum.
Supp. 1979). Rule 5A(8), however, is included in S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES
FOR THE EXAMINATION AND ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO PRACTICE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
(Dec. 14, 1979). That portion of the rule reads:
(8) has passed an examination on the Code of Professional Responsibility
given under the auspices of the Multistate Bar Examination Committee of the
National Conference of Bar Examiners and received thereon a minimum grade
as determined by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Arrangements to take
said examination, including the payment of any fees therefor, shall be made
directly with the Multistate Bar Examination Committee of the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners. The effective date of this provision is July 1, 1981.
Since passage of the separate Multistate Professional Responsibility Examina-
tion is required, there shall be no limit to the number of times an applicant
may take said examination.
S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES FOR EXAMINATION AND ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO
PRACTICE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA (Dec. 14, 1979).
95. ADMISSION RULES 5A(5).
96. Id. 5B.
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Examination on the Code of Professional Responsibility.
9 7
All first-time applicants for bar examinations given after
July 1, 1981, must successfully complete the course require-
ments.98 The court's order suggests courses under each subject-
matter area that satisfy the requirement, but that list is not in-
tended to be an exclusive list of courses meeting the require-
ment."" Subject matter rather 'than course name determines
whether the requirement is satisfied by a given course.100 An ap-
plicant who has not completed the course requirements will be
allowed to take the bar examination, with admission to practice
contingent on subsequent completion of the required courses. 101
The applicant need not complete this instruction at the law
school from which he graduated, but may complete the course
requirements at any law school approved by the American Bar
Association or the South Carolina Supreme Court. 02 Lawyers
who have practiced for three years in another state may be ad-
mitted to practice in South Carolina without meeting the
course-requirement rule.103
97. Rule 5A(8), S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES FOR THE EXAMINATION AND
ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO PRACTICE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA (Dec. 14, 1979).
98. ADMISSION RULES 5A(5). In the court's first order the specific subject areas in-
cluded constitutional law, contracts, property, legal writing and research, torts, civil pro-
cedure, criminal law process, commercial law, business associations, domestic relations,
professional responsibility, equity, evidence, administrative law and procedure, trial ad-
vocacy, taxation, insurance, and legal accounting. A total of sixty-one credit-hours in
specified courses was required. (The minimum number of hours required for graduation
from the University of South Carolina School of Law is eighty-four). The second order
deleted domestic relations, administrative law, and insurance from the requirement. The
business associations area was redesignated as business law with legal accounting recat-
egorized as a subject that could satisfy the business course requirement. The second or-
der also deleted the credit-hour requirements altogether.
The first order also included amended Rule 6 that would have required those appli-
cants taking the bar examination for the first time in July 1984 to have completed
twenty-seven undergraduate semester credit-hours in United States history, English
composition, English, public speaking, economics, and accounting. The second order de-
leted the required undergraduate subjects and substituted Rule 16. This provision di-
rects the Clerk of the Supreme Court to notify prelaw student advisers of all South Caro-
lina undergraduate institutions (and others upon request) in July of each year that nine
undergraduate courses are recommended to persons wishing to study law. These courses
are English composition, English, public speaking, United States history, accounting, ec-
onomics, logic, literature, political science, and philosophy.
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Rule 5B provides that although an applicant is admitted to
practice, he may not try a case alone until he has had eleven
"trial experiences.' 14 The rule defines a trial experience as: "(1)
actual participation in a full trial under the direct supervision of
a member of the Bar, or (2) an observation of an entire con-
tested testimonial-type hearing in a South Carolina Tribu-
nal."'10 5 Each prospective litigator must file a certificate with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court indicating that he has observed or
participated in the specified number of trial experiences in civil,
criminal, equity, and family courts, and before an administrative
officer.106 A student may not begin his trial experiences until he
has completed two-thirds of the credit-hours required for law
school graduation.1
0 7
The court's last order added a third new requirement for
prospective members of the bar. Rule 5A(8) requires an appli-
cant to pass an examination on the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility prepared and administered by the Multistate Bar
Examination Committee. 08 The purpose of the examination is
"not . . .to exclude persons from the practice of law but to in-
sure that they study and be prepared to cope with ethical
problems of the legal profession."'1 9 There is no limit on the
104. Id. 5B.
105. Id. The first order called for trial experiences in state courts only but the sec-
ond order broadened the rule to allow some of the trial experiences to be in federal
court.
106. ADMISSION RULES 5A(5).
107. Id. Rule 5B was designed apparently to help prospective litigators become
more familiar with courtroom procedures. While the objective is sound, the rule does
little to achieve it. Because students are given a choice between observation and partici-
pation, students may opt for the observation-type experience requiring no advance prep-
aration and far fewer total hours. Because none of the trial experiences are required to
be participatory, the rule as written encourages students to take the easier method for
compliance.
108. S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES FOR THE EXAMINATION AND ADMISSION OF
PERSONS TO PRACTICE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA (Dec. 14, 1979).
109. Letter dated December 3, 1979, to the Honorable Richard E. Day, Dean of the
University of South Carolina School of Law, from Ms. Frances H. Smith, Clerk of the
South Carolina Supreme Court. At least two questions are raised by the required exami-
nation on the Code of Professional Responsibility. The most obvious issue is whether
such an examination is needed, given that the South Carolina Bar Examination already
includes a legal ethics section. Also significant is the fact that the American Bar Associa-
tion will propose a new body of rules, the Rules for Professional Conduct, in the near
future. See Kutak, supra note 52. Because many students will be caught in the transi-
tion, a required examination at this time is of minimal value.
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number of times the test may be taken.
B. Present Members of the Bar-Rules on
Lawyer Competence
In a further effort to assure lawyer competency, the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina issued an order on September
26, 1979, entitled "Rules on Lawyer Competence." 110 With this
order, the court instituted mandatory continuing legal education
(MCLE) and established a plan by which lawyers can become
certified as specialists. The order established a ten-member
Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competence charged with
administering both the MCLE and specialization programs."""
The South Carolina MCLE program requires that twelve hours
of MCLE credit be obtained annually by all bar members, ex-
cept certified specialists (who must meet separate continuing ed-
ucation requirements), lawyers having practiced for more than
thirty years, 2 and lawyers not enrolled as active members of
the bar."'
The Commission will designate specialty fields and appoint
Specialization Advisory Boards to establish certification stan-
dards and procedures. 1 1 4 Certified specialists, however, may con-
tinue to practice in all fields of the law. The Commission will
consider designation for specialty fields in which certification
may be obtained either upon petition of one hundred bar mem-
110. S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES ON LAWYER COMPETENCE (Sept. 26,
1979).
111. Id. The Commission members are appointed by the court from a list of twenty
bar members nominated by the House of Delegates of the South Carolina Bar. Id.
112. S.C. Supreme Court, Order re Rules on Lawyer Competence (Sept. 26, 1979).
Wisconsin is apparently the only state other than South Carolina to include a "grandfa-
ther clause" in its MCLE requirement. Wisconsin lawyers seventy years old and older
are exempt from MCLE. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256 app. R. 3 (West Supp. 1979-80).
113. S.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER RE RULES ON LAWYER COMPETENCE (Sept. 26,
1979). The specifics of the MCLE plan will be developed by the Commission. One issue
for resolution is whether credit hours may be obtained in ways other than attendance at
formal CLE courses. For example, would an attorney receive MCLE credit for the publi-
cation of a scholarly article, delivery of a paper at a professional meeting, teaching a
CLE course (added credit for preparation time?), teaching a law school course, or attend-
ing an in-house course presented by employer firms and governmental agencies? The
preliminary discussion draft of proposed MCLE regulations is reprinted in The Tran-
script, Apr. 1980, at 5, col. 1.
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bers or the Commission's own initiative. This designation will
depend on several factors, including the public interest to be
served, the bar's interest in the area, the ability to establish pro-
ficiency standards readily, the availability of a CLE program in
the area, and the compatability of the designation with the goals
of certified specialization in South Carolina.11
An active member in good standing with the bar may apply
for certification in a speciality field with payment of a fee and
submission of the names of five attorneys who can attest to the
lawyer's competency in the field. The applicant must have prac-
ticed law for five years, although this requirement can be waived
by the specific Advisory Board upon a satisfactory showing that
the applicant has specialized post-graduate education or concen-
trated experience in the given area that is equal to five years of
practice. The applicant may then be certified under one of three
methods: (1) a satisfactory showing of "substantial involvement"
in the field for five years, (2) a satisfactory completion of a pro-
gram of special instruction approved by the Board, or (3) satis-
factory completion of oral and/or written examinations in the
speciality area.116
C. Questions Raised by These Changes
As indicated, the changes made by the supreme court are
designed to reduce perceived deficiencies among practicing at-
torneys. Yet, the changes raise a number of concerns, particu-
larly that they will not effectively achieve the court's goal.
One commentator 1 7 has succinctly framed the issues raised
by the assertion of a competency problem in the profession:
-What seems to be the problem?
-What is the nature and extent of the incompetence that gives
concern?
-How suited are the curative measures for the actual disorders?
-What are the side effects, if any?
-What may be the alternatives, if any?1 8
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 613 (1977).
118. Id. at 614.
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Proper evaluation of the merits of a particular remedy for law-
yer incompetence requires consideration of the threshold issues
of the definition, extent, and causes of incompetency. Answers to
these questions are needed to ascertain whether a given remedy
will be an effective cure for the perceived deficiency.
Some members of the legal profession question the accuracy
of the assertion that there is widespread incompetence among
lawyers. 11 9 One writer suggests that "the evidence of 'incompe-
tence,' like its very definition, is vague and ambiguous. Impres-
sionistic accounts, by judges and others, are diverse and conflict-
ing. There is no consensus."120
Among those who agree that there is a problem, there are
diverse views concerning the nature of the incompetency causing
the problem. One viewpoint is that "[t]he significant qualities
distinguishing good from bad lawyers-and, thus, the areas for
truly major concern about 'competence'-are matters of charac-
ter, judgment, wisdom, morals, and attitude, not the business of
technical proficiency.' 2' A federal judge, in a similar vein,
pointed out that "[i]nsofar as bad lawyering is the product of
bad character, or laziness, or apathy, there is little that can be
done by way of education.' 22 In contrast, the committee to
study lawyer incompentency in the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that incompetence, at least in the context of trial
advocacy, is "directly attributable to the lack of legal
training.'
' 23
If incompetency is caused primarily by characterological de-
ficiencies, such as poor work habits or lack of personal integrity,
then the remedies implemented by the supreme court would not
appear to be well-suited to raising the level of competency. If,
however, incompetency stems from a deficiency in legal skills or
119. Id. at 617.
120. Id. at 620.
121. Id. at 618.
122. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPE-
TENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 16 (1979)(quoting Address by Judge Irving R.
Kaufman, ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 15, 1974)).
123. Final Report of the Advisory Committee of Proposed Rules for Admission to
Practice, 67 F.R.D. 161, 164 (1975). The committee's finding was based on "interviews of
considerable length with approximately forty judges of the Second Circuit." Id. The
committee proposed that, in the district courts of the Second Circuit, admission to prac-
tice be conditioned on either successful completion of law school or CLE courses in five
designated subject areas. Id. at 188.
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knowledge, then the steps taken by the court may well result in
an upgrading of lawyer competency. The supreme court faced a
void of factual data when it attempted to structure responsive
solutions to the unknown causes of alleged incompetence. Per-
haps because competency is a nebulous concept, the court felt
constrained to select immediate, intuitively guided action over
continued inaction.
The court is urged to remain receptive to alternatives if the
measures adopted prove to be unsatisfactory. If incompetency is
a serious problem in the profession, the public may be falsely
placated if there is no empirical proof that the measures imple-
mented have been successful. The court is urged to evaluate the
steps taken to improve lawyer competency in terms of their
costs and benefits. The benefits to be derived from specifying
law courses, for example, may be negligible or even nonexistent.
The costs, however, in terms of problems engendered by the
rule, are not insubstantial.
The fundamental problem with the law school course re-
quirement is the questionable validity of its two underlying
premises. Presumably, the court, to arrive at the order mandat-
ing courses in specific areas, reached two conclusions. First, pre-
sent methods of assuring competency must have been found to
be lacking. Second, the requirement of legal education in certain
areas of the law, must have been found, in combination with
other requirements of the court order, to be the most effective
way to improve the competency of the South Carolina bar. It is
disturbing that the court made no factual findings to support
these two necessary conclusions, but apparently relied on an in-
tuitive feeling that the measures it adopted would result in im-
proved competency. Indeed, the court regularly observes the
performance of a certain segment of the bar. It is questionable,
however, whether this observation is a sufficient basis for the
conclusion concerning the general incompetency of the bar, ab-
sent factual findings that the present means of assuring lawyer
competency (bar examinations and disciplinary sanctions) have
failed. Further, no statistical data have shown that course re-
quirements will improve lawyer competency.124 Completion of a
course in a particular area of law does not assure the ability to
124. See text accompanying notes 132 & 133 supra.
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practice law in that area. The bar examination is designed to
assure that new lawyers have a basic knowledge in substantive
areas of the law. Without facts to show that required courses
will better prepare the lawyer, it would seem preferable to let
bar examinations determine this facet of competency.
Since the rule has been modified by reducing the number of
prescribed course areas and deleting the requirement of speci-
fied hours, the course requirement does not work substantial
hardship on most law students. The required courses are basic
ones that most students ordinarily would elect to take. Yet, the
rule will remain exclusionary to some extent. Law graduates
from out-of-state law schools who seek to practice in South Car-
olina may find they have not taken all of the courses required
for admission to the bar. These persons will not be absolutely
excluded, of course, since the required instruction can be ac-
quired later.' 2' The rule, nevertheless, may deter prospective
out-of-state lawyers from seeking employment in South Caro-
lina. Thus, the rule may place South Carolina law firms at a
competitive disadvantage in recruiting graduates of out-of-state
law schools who have not completed courses in the required
areas.
Additionally, despite its modifications, the rule undoubtedly
will have an impact on the flexibility of legal education. Because
of the increased demand for required courses, some elective
courses may be eliminated or offered infrequently due to lack of
sufficient enrollment. Law students interested in specialty elec-
tives and clinics programs may suffer and the scheduling of
courses will become more burdensome. Without substantial fac-
tual documentation supporting the necessity and likely success
of the court's imposition into the domain of legal education, it
would be preferable to leave course requirements to the judg-
ment of professional educators. Two commentators,128 criticizing
the course requirement proposal of the Clare Committee to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, stated:
We begin with a "deficiency" which is shaky at best. We leap
to a cure without a scintilla of evidence-really and truly with-
out any evidence at all-that there is any connection between
125. See text accompanying notes 101 & 102 supra.
126. Pedrick & Frank, Trial Incompetence: Questioning the Clare Cure, Tm ,
Mar. 1976, at 47.
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the evil to be corrected and the remedy sought to be ap-
plied. . . . For all we know, most of the incompetents may
have taken most of the very courses which are now to be
prescribed.
127
An American Bar Association task force on lawyer competency
recently issued its report recommending to bar admission au-
thorities that completion of specific law school courses not be
required prerequisites to taking bar examinations. 28 The report
stated that "[r]equirements cast in terms of specific courses tend
to emphasize information rather than fundamental lawyer skills
and produce a more rigid law cirriculum, discouraging innova-
tion and efforts to improve fundamental skills training.
1 29
Indiana is the only other state known to have implemented
a law school course requirement rule.130 The rationale for the In-
diana rule was that performance on the Indiana bar examination
would be improved by appropriate course selection in law
school: "[ilt is the purpose of the . . . Rule to assure against
another instance of high ratio of failures among law graduates
taking the Indiana examination."131 ' A study conducted subse-
quent to the implementation of the rule revealed no correlation
between course selections and bar examination results.1 3 2 The
educators who conducted the study concluded:
Our analysis of the performance of Indiana University
graduates on recent bar examinations found no support for the
rationale behind Rule 13. No course or group of courses had
any consistent relationship to success or failure on the bar
exam. Thus we do not have a situation in which one is forced
127. Id. at 52, 54.
128. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPE-
TENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979).
129. Id. at 5.
130. See IND. CT. R. 13-V(C); Beytagh, Prescribed Courses as Prerequisites for Tak-
ing Bar Examinations: Indiana's Experiment in Controlling Legal Education, 26 J. LE-
GAL EDuc. 449, 452 (1974). Completion of required courses may be a prerequisite for
admission to practice in states that admit some law graduates to practice without sitting
for a bar examination. The "diploma privilege" currently exists in Mississippi, Montana,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIGEST (1978).
131. Court Amends Admission, Trial, and Criminal Rules, REs GESTAE, Jan. 1974,
at 13.
132. See Cutright, Cutright & Boshkoff, Course Selection, Student Characteristics
and Bar Examination Performance: The Indiana University Law School Experience, 27
J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1975).
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to balance the gains to be achieved through compliance with
Rule 13 against the cost of the Rule. Our study shows that
there was no gain for the 1973-74 graduates and strongly sug-
gests there will be no gain for future graduates. 13
If a course requirement rule does not improve bar examination
results, then it is unlikely that such a rule will improve lawyer
competency generally.
Several methods for achieving competency among lawyers
already admitted to the bar are being examined throughout the
United States, including periodic reexamination, specialization,
peer review, and mandatory continuing- legal education. 34
MCLE appears to be the most widely accepted method of main-
taining competency 38 Compulsory CLE is not without its crit-
ics, however."'3 The criticisms generally advanced against a
mandatory program include the following: (1) the attorney is not
tested at the conclusion of the course and thus there is no way
to know if the instruction was truly effective in increasing com-
petency; (2) the attorney might attend courses not really useful
to him just to fulfill the requirement; (3) the program is superfi-
cial and is designed only to placate the public demands on the
profession; and (4) the registration fees, time away from work,
and travel expenses will be a financial hardship on young attor-
neys.13 7 One must question the necessity of requiring that all
lawyers, regardless of their knowledge and skill, attend a speci-
fied number of CLE course hours. As discussed above, an im-
provement in lawyer competency certainly cannot be guaranteed
by the mere attendance of courses. Given the uncertainty of the
133. Id. at 136.
134. See Comment, 56 Nan. L. RE V. 676 (1977). See generally Bratt, Beyond the
Law School Classroom and Clinic-A Multidisciplinary Approach to Legal Education,
13 N. ENG. L. REv. 199 (1977); Campbell, Training Law Students Outside the Class-
room: Some Experience and Some Comments, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208 (1974); Manning,
Law Schools and Lawyer Schools-Two-Tier Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379
(1974).
135. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 610 app. R. 123 (West Supp. 1979-80); MINN. SUP.
CT. (CLE) R. 1-7; WASH. CT. (APR) R. 11; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256 app. R. 1-13 (West
Supp. 1979-80).
136. See Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574
(1975); Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 1064
(1975).
137. See Kavanaugh, Performance Evaluation, Education, and Testing: Alterna-
tives to Punishment in Professional Regulation, 30 U. MIAu L. REV. 953, 954-55 (1956).
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benefits to be derived, one must also consider the costs borne by
the attorneys resulting from transportation, tuition fees, and lost
opportunities while absent from the office. The absence of any
mechanism for appraising lawyer competency after the MCLE
plan has been in operation makes it impossible to determine if
the program is achieving its goal of improved competency.
MCLE must be more than a scheme to boost the public's opin-
ion of the profession by mere attendance at the requisite num-
ber of seminars.
The certification of specialists is probably a sound develop-
ment because it provides an assurance of competency that does
not exist when there are only the self-styled specialists. Yet the
validity of the assumption that passing an examination or prac-
ticing in an area for a given length of time proves that one is
competent in the area may be questioned.138 "May not an exam-
ination simply reflect the aptitude and willingness of an
unimaginative and uncreative attorney to memorize factual data
successfully? May not 'experience in the field' indicate merely a
well-worn rut obviating the possibility of fresh approaches that
might foster the growth of the substantive law?" 13 19 There is also
the possibility that widespread specialization may lead to such a
sharp increase in fees that there will be a decrease in the availa-
bility of lawyers whose fees are within the reach of those needing
their services. Besides the potential for higher legal fees engen-
dered by specialist status, some members of the public may be
unable to ascertain the exact specialization they need. "Practi-
cally speaking, will the public be able to dispense with the diag-
nostic services of the general practitioner?
'1 40
If the measures for assuring competence presently in use in
South Carolina prove to be unsatisfactory, several alternatives
are available, including a stricter bar examination covering all
areas which the court deems essential to the competent practice
of law, an expanded clinics program in law school, replacement
of the third year of law school with an internship, or implemen-
tation of a peer review system. Peer review would provide a
mechanism for developing the empirical data necessary to assess
the extent of the competency problem, as- well as for curing the
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problem itself. An American Law Institute-American Bar Asso-
ciation joint committee is presently finalizing the draft of a pro-
posed Model Peer Review System.141 The draft describes three
plans, referral peer review, disciplinary peer review, and law
practice peer review.1 42 The peer review system is attractive
from a cost-benefit perspective since it is "tailored to affect only
those lawyers who perform inadequately 143 and is responsive to
all types of incompetence. The importance of applying a cost-
benefit analysis to proposed remedial measures must not be
understated:
The question raised concerns the relative weights of the costs
and the benefits-whether the costs of the proposed remedies
are justified by prevailing conditions and by what they will ac-
complish. This is a legitimate inquiry because it is not the pro-
fession alone which bears the cost; ultimately, the cost in some
form is passed on to the consumer or taxpayer.
144
As stated in the report of the Devitt Committee, 145 "[p]eer re-
view has the advantage of directing the remedy to the attorneys




141. See Smith, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A.J. 451 (1980).
142. Id. at 453, 454.
143. Id. at 452.
144. Id.
145. The Devitt Committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States "to investigate the quality of trial advocacy in the federal courts, and if
deficiences were found, to recommend ways that those deficiences could be remedied."
Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the
Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F.R.D. 215, 218
(1979).
146. Id. at Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to
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